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Chapter 4
Effects of the Economic Crisis on the Older
Population: How Expectations, Consumption,
Bequests, and Retirement Responded to
Market Shocks
Michael Hurd and Susann Rohwedder

The financial crisis that unfolded rapidly in the latter part of 2008 developed into a recession that stands out from other recessions of the postWorld War II era in several important ways. The stock market began to
decline in October 2007. At first moderate, the pace of the decline
increased rapidly, coinciding with the troubles in the financial sector that
began in September 2008. By March 2009, the S&P 500 had lost more than
50 percent from its peak 2007 level (Coronado and Dynan, 2012). The
swings in the economic environment have been unequalled since the
Great Depression, and the crisis has also affected several markets simultaneously (housing, stock, and labor market), consequently providing a
number of channels through which individuals and their households
might be affected. The economic crisis and the subsequent increase in
the unemployment rate operated through several channels, affecting people of different ages in differing ways.
The at-retirement population has been vulnerable to negative shocks in
the equity and housing markets because of their asset positions, and
somewhat less obviously because of linkages to their children. On the
positive side, they have been relatively unaffected by unemployment. Furthermore, because of the importance of Social Security to the bottom half
of the income distribution, many less-well-off older households were unaffected directly by the crisis. The older preretirement population has also
accumulated equity and, because of the transition from defined benefit
(DB) to defined contribution (DC) pensions, their sources of retirement
income security are subject to capital market risk. On the other hand,
because of relatively high rates of labor force participation, they are vulnerable to unemployment. When they lost jobs, they had little time to recover
from those losses. In contrast to the retired population, those of working
age at the lower end of the income distribution were particularly vulnerable
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to unemployment. Another consideration is how housing values behaved.
After appreciating for some time, the housing market reached its maximum in May 2006 and then began a long downward slide. While stocks
have recovered somewhat since then, the housing market has not.
This chapter studies the effects of the financial crisis on the population
aged 55+, drawing on longitudinal data from the Health and Retirement
Study (HRS), a household dataset containing observations from the time
before the economic crisis began until it was well underway, with the latest
available data point in 2009. The HRS data, collected every two years since
1992, span this period. Especially when combined with supplemental data
collections, the HRS provides very rich information for the study of the
effects of the financial crisis on older households. Specifically, in 2001, the
HRS began collecting longitudinal data on household spending: this effort
is repeated every two years. In 2009, much of the HRS Internet study
content was dedicated to eliciting information relevant to measuring the
effects of the financial crisis. In what follows, we analyze changes in consumption associated with the crisis and examine housing, expectations,
and retirement among older Americans.1

Data sources
The analysis focuses on the HRS from the 2006 and 2008 core surveys, as
well as from two supplemental studies: the Consumption and Activities Mail
Survey (CAMS) and the HRS Internet study. The HRS is a biennial panel
first conducted in 1992, with the cohorts born between 1931 and 1941 as
the target population (Juster and Suzman, 1995). Additional cohorts were
added in 1993 and 1998, so that in 2000 the HRS represented the population from the cohorts of 1947 and earlier. In 2004, new cohorts were again
added, making the HRS representative of the population aged 51+. In
September 2001, CAMS Wave 1 was mailed to 5,000 households selected
at random from households that had participated in HRS 2000. In couples’
households, it was sent to one of the two spouses at random. The fact that
the CAMS sample was drawn directly from the HRS 2000 sample offered
an important advantage: it allowed the CAMS data to be linked to the vast
amount of information collected in prior waves of the HRS on those
participating in the core longitudinal survey. In 2003, 2005, 2007, and
2009, CAMS Waves 2–5 were sent to these same 5,000 households.2 To
facilitate panel analysis, the structure of the questionnaire was almost the
same in each of these waves (Hurd and Rohwedder, 2006).
CAMS asked respondents about their spending in each of the thirty-two
categories which cover almost all spending according to the Consumer
Expenditure Survey (CEX). Rates of item nonresponse were small. Some
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values could be imputed to zero with considerable confidence, due to the
information in the linked HRS core data.3 The 2009 HRS Internet survey is
the third wave in a series of Internet surveys of a subset of HRS respondents. Eligibility to participate in the 2009 wave was determined by
whether, in the 2008 core HRS survey, a respondent reported regularly
using the Internet, and about 7,000 respondents qualified.4 The resulting
sample tends to overrepresent those with higher education, but this bias is
less for those aged 65 or younger in the HRS; in this age group, Internet
usage is more common throughout the distribution of both education and
wealth.5 The field period was March 2009–August 2009. For the purposes of
this chapter, we will refer to the data collection as having taken place in May
2009.
The HRS Internet survey has a module on the economic effects of the
crisis on individual households, as well as modules on health and life
satisfaction. To measure responses about the crisis’s economic effects,
broadly our approach is to find within-person changes in important outcomes that have resulted from the crisis.

Effects of the crisis on the economic
circumstances of HRS households
A broad gauge of the scale of the impact of the economic crisis is the simple
response to a question about whether a respondent has been affected.
About 28 percent of respondents reported that they had been affected a
lot, about 46 percent said they had been affected a little, and just 26
percent reported not having been affected.

Effects on consumption
Economists deem consumption a better measure of economic well-being
than income or wealth. To judge whether households reduced consumption in response to the crisis, the HRS Internet survey asked respondents
how their spending compared with a year earlier. In May 2008, prices in the
housing market had begun to decline, but the stock market was still at a
relatively high level (the large declines in stocks began later in the year).
Unemployment was at 5.4 percent, although it had been increasing.
Accordingly, from the typical household’s point of view, the economic
crisis was still in the future.
Table 4.1 shows the percentages of respondents indicating in May 2009
that their spending had increased, decreased, or remained the same,
compared with a year earlier. In normal times, we would expect that for
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Table 4.1 Household spending 2011 compared to a year ago (%)
Age (years)
55–64
65–74
75+
Total

Increased

About the same

Decreased

14.7
19.2
23.9
17.1

52.7
56.7
59.3
54.5

32.6
24.1
16.8
28.5

Source: Authors’ calculations from weighted HRS data.

Table 4.2 Important reasons for spending decline by age: percent stating very or
somewhat important
Age
Needed to Lower
Worse
Stocks
Lower
(years) reduce debt income employment down house value

55–64
65–74
75+
Total

74.5
63.6
46.5
69.9

76.4
71.8
59
74.1

53.7
36.9
14.2
47.2

56.3
65.7
64.6
59.2

53.4
48.9
42.2
51.6

Worried
about
economic
future
86.4
82.1
80
84.9

Source: Authors’ calculations from weighted HRS data.

the younger age groups, spending would increase over time, and this is
what we observe in cross-section spending data. But among respondents in
their 50s, more than 30 percent said their spending had decreased, whereas
only about 15 percent said it had increased. For those aged 65+, however,
the pattern reverses, which is the first indicator that the older population
was relatively better protected from the effects of the crisis.
The Internet survey contained follow-up questions to assess more directly
the importance of various reasons for any changes in spending for respondents reporting having lowered their spending. Table 4.2 shows the percent that indicated that a specific reason for reducing spending was very
important or somewhat important. Averaged over all ages, 85 percent of
respondents indicated that being worried about the economic future was
an important factor. Although the differences by age are not large, in the
oldest age group this percentage was somewhat lower. There is disagreement in the literature about whether households will change their spending in response to movements in asset prices such as stocks or housing. In
the HRS, about half of respondents who had decreased spending attributed their actions to declines in asset prices (stocks and housing). With
regard to the other reasons, there is a clear age gradient: the older population was less likely to have reduced spending because of the need to reduce
debt, having a lower income, or worse employment prospects.

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/8/2012, SPi

68

Reshaping Retirement Security

Table 4.3 Important reasons for spending increase by age: percent stating very or
somewhat important
Age
(years)
55–64
65–74
75+
Total

Wealth
increased

Better
employment

Higher
mortgage
payment

Increased
spending needs

More
optimistic

42.8
36.9
20.8
37.4

32.2
15.4
7
23

31.4
27.8
11.6
27.2

92.3
96.2
96
94.2

42.7
63.9
51.6
51.1

Source: Authors’ calculations from weighted HRS data.

The Internet survey also asked those respondents who said their spending had increased to indicate the importance of various reasons. Broadly
speaking, a household’s spending might increase due to an increase in the
household’s economic resources (a positive reason) or due to an increase
in the household’s needs (possibly a negative reason), such as higher
mortgage payments, for example. Table 4.3 shows the distribution of responses among those who said spending had increased. Almost all respondents cited increased spending needs. About half of the respondents were
optimistic about their economic future, in sharp contrast to those who had
reduced spending (Table 4.2). It is notable, however, that among those
aged 55–64, fewer had increased spending because of optimism. Because
just 15 percent of this group had increased their spending (Table 4.1), the
fraction of the total population aged 55–64 that spent more because of
optimism is only about 6 percent.
About one-third of the 55–64-year-olds cited better employment as a
reason for increasing spending, compared with a negligible percentage in
the 75+ age group which is mostly retired. About 30 percent of those aged
55–64 attributed more spending to higher mortgage payments. This is in
line with rising housing debt (which we will examine directly below), and
possibly with balloon mortgages that were a frequent financing instrument
during the housing-market bubble.
These changes in consumption observed in the Internet survey are selfassessed. While respondents may have good qualitative knowledge of
the changes they have made, they are considerably less likely to have a
good quantitative assessment. Accordingly, to quantify the magnitude of
spending declines, we use CAMS to compare two-year panel transitions in
spending in ‘normal’ times, with two-year panel transitions during the
economic crisis. We define ‘normal’ times to be 2001–7, and the time of
the economic crisis to be 2007–9. We average three panel transitions in
spending (2001–3, 2003–5, and 2005–7) so as to smooth out noise in the
data and average out other macro shocks. We disaggregate by age band
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because the older population may have been better protected, as suggested
by the self-assessed differences in changes in spending shown in Table 4.1.
Table 4.4 shows changes in mean and median spending, both overall and
for nondurables, adjusted for price changes.6 Among those aged 50–64,
mean total spending declined by about 2.1 percent every two years, averaged over the period 2001–7. This reduction is likely due to a number of
reasons, such as changes in household composition or parental support for
children’s education.7 The decline in mean nondurable spending among
this age group was about 1 percent per two-year period. Among those aged
65+, reductions were much greater, amounting to 6.3 percent in mean total
spending and 4.9 percent in mean nondurable spending. These reductions
are likely life cycle effects. During the economic crisis, consumption fell at
a much greater rate: almost 10 percent for the younger age group and
9 percent for the older one. The levels and changes in the medians are
smaller, but the patterns are the same.
We summarize and compare the results for the two age groups in
Table 4.5. Among those aged 50–64, mean spending declined between
2007 and 2009 by 7.6 percentage points more than between 2001 and
Table 4.4 Two-year change in real consumption: 2001–7 and 2007–9
Percent change in means
2001–7

Percent change in medians

2007–9

2001–7

2007–9

Age 50–64
Total consumption
Nondurable consumption

2.1
1

9.9
8.6

2.3
0.6

7.5
7.3

Age 65+
Total consumption
Nondurable consumption

6.3
4.9

9.1
8.3

3.3
3

5.9
6.4

Source: Authors’ calculations from weighted HRS data.

Table 4.5 Summary of two-year change in nondurable spending (%)
Means
50–64
2001–7
2007–9
2007–9 change minus average of two-year changes
from 2001 to 2007
Source: Authors’ calculations from weighted HRS data.

1
8.6
7.6

Medians
65+
4.9
8.3
3.4

50–64
0.6
7.3
6.7

65+
3
6.4
3.4
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2007. Among those aged 65+, spending declined by 3.4 percentage points
more in the later period than the earlier. Our interpretation is that,
indeed, spending declined in response to the economic crisis, and that
the comparisons of actual measured spending are consistent with the selfassessments in Table 4.1. Furthermore, spending by the older population
declined less during the crisis than spending by the younger population, in
keeping with our expectations that the older population was better protected against the economic crisis and the self-reports of Table 4.1.

Effects on housing
Whether homeowners were affected by the large drops in home values, and
how seriously they were affected, depends on where they live and when they
live. According to the Case–Shiller twenty-city average,8 prices peaked in
May 2006 at about 50 percent above the level at which they had been at the
beginning of 2003, but this average conceals substantial intercity variation.
In Denver, there was a moderate increase in housing prices, followed by a
small decline. In Los Angeles and Phoenix, prices peaked at more than 100
percent above their 2003 value and declined thereafter by more than half.
Thus, a family living in Denver would be relatively unaffected by price
changes, while a family living in Los Angeles or Phoenix might be affected
depending on its purchase date, method of financing, and the family’s
overall economic situation. For example, a family that bought a house in
2003 and took on a mortgage that was reasonable in relation to family
income could have sound finances today, even though the value of the
home dropped below its 2006 peak. However, if a family bought at the top
of the market with a small percentage downpayment and a balloon loan,
that family would now find itself with substantial negative home equity and
increased mortgage costs that it might not be able to afford.
The HRS asks respondents about the value of their houses, both in the
core survey and the Internet study. These data have the advantages of being
reports on the same house over time and being nationally representative.
Other commonly used data sources are based on recent actual property
sales (possibly including refinanced properties) or on the Case–Shiller
index, confined to twenty large cities.
Over several waves of the HRS, the longitudinal rate of homeownership
has remained constant at almost 90 percent. Table 4.6 shows mean and
median house values, and mean and median housing debt, as reported by
HRS respondents in 2006, 2008, and 2009, converted to 2010 dollars. Mean
house values declined between 2006 and 2008 by about 7 percent real per
year, and the median declined by about 4 percent real over the same time
period.9 Between 2008 and the HRS Internet survey, on average about nine
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Table 4.6 Home values and housing debt balances ($000, 2010)
Year

2006
2008
2009

Home value

Housing debt

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

358.6
309.9
282.5

248.8
227.9
203.3

81.7
74.8
80.4

32.4
30.4
30.5

Notes: Only households who report owning a home in all three years are included and for
whom there is no missing information on whether they have a mortgage and on whether they
have other home loans. Housing debt includes the value of any mortgages and other home
loans on the primary residence. Input values allowed on amount. Constant weights used for all
statistics (2008 household weights) to ensure that variation in statistics across waves is not due
to cross-wave variation in weights.
Source: Authors’ calculations from weighted HRS data; N = 2,630.

months later, the decline was about 9 percent real, and the decline in the
median was about 11 percent real. These are, of course, very substantial
reductions in the most important asset of most Americans. The mean value
of housing debt (mortgage balances plus other outstanding home loans)
expressed in 2010 dollars dropped by about 4 percent per year between
2006 and 2008, and the median dropped by about 3 percent per year over
the same period. Note that in nominal dollars the mean was almost constant between 2006 and 2008, and the median did not change, implying
that at the population level there was almost no net pay-off of mortgage
balances over that period. However, in just the short period between the
2008 HRS core interview and the HRS Internet interview, the mean value of
housing debt increased by about $6,000 or 7.5 percent, while the median
remained unchanged. The increase in the mean could be due to equity
extraction, which may have made households more vulnerable to other
economic shocks, such as unemployment. When combined with the reduction in house prices, the debt-to-value ratio increased between 2008 and
the Internet survey.
Table 4.6 is calculated over all households that reported owning a home
in all three surveys.10 It also includes some who did not fully report actual
values for house prices and for their mortgages or other home loans; most
of the nonreporters reported a bracket. Thus, Table 4.7 excludes anyone
with an imputed value because we want to report the fraction of households
with negative housing equity: the imputation of a value even within a
bracket could falsely classify some as having more mortgage than house
value. A comparison of Table 4.7 with Table 4.6 shows that excluding
respondents with incomplete reports does not materially affect the conclusions we make about the trends in home value and housing debt on
average.11 The table shows that in 2006 and 2008, about 1.1–1.4 percent
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Table 4.7 Home values, housing debt, and negative home equity ($000, 2010)
Year

2006
2008
2009

Home value ($)

Housing
debt ($)

Negative home equity (%)

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

All
homeowners

Only households with
housing debta

361.9
320.1
292.2

270.4
243.1
223.6

86.2
77.7
84.1

40
32.4
30.5

1.1
1.4
3.9

1.8
2.4
6.7

a

Number of households with housing debt varies across waves: 1,187 in 2006; 1,128 in 2008;
1,111 in 2009.
Notes: Same sample as in Table 4.6, but imposing the additional restriction that none of the
amounts are imputed. N = 2,106. Constant weights used for all statistics (2008 household
weights) to ensure that variation in statistics across waves is not due to cross-wave variation in
weights.
Source: Authors’ calculations from weighted HRS data.

of homeowners owed more than their house was worth.12 Among homeowners with a mortgage, 1.8–2.4 percent had negative equity. But by 2009,
3.9 percent of all homeowners had negative equity and 6.7 percent of those
with a mortgage had negative equity.

House price expectations
As reported in Table 4.2, an important reason for a reduction in spending
was worries about the economic future. We assess one component of
expectations about the economic future—house price expectations. Respondents were asked about expectations that their own home would
appreciate in price, in the form of a subjective probability as follows:
On a scale from 0 percent to 100 percent where 0 means that you think there is no
chance and 100 means that you think the event is absolutely sure to happen, what
do you think are the chances that by next year at this time your home will be worth
more than it is today?

In follow-up questions, respondents were asked about additional price
targets, such as an increase in value of 10 or 20 percent or a decrease in
value of 10 or 20 percent. Respondents were also asked the same question
with a time horizon of five years.
Table 4.8 shows the average of those subjective probabilities. The average
subjective probability that respondents expected their houses to be worth
more in a year than they were at the interview date was just 32 percent. This
indicates that individuals were very pessimistic about the housing market,
and these expectations were very much different from historical trends. For
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Table 4.8 House price expectations, one year and five years ahead
1 year from now
Any increase
Increase by 10% or more
Increase by 20% or more
Decrease by 10% or more
Decrease by 20% or more
N

32.3
21.3
10.6
18.5
11
1,820

5 years from now
53.5
47
28
13.7
9.2
1,723

Source: Authors’ calculations from weighted HRS data.

instance, housing price data show that in 88 percent of one-year intervals
between 1991 and 2009, housing prices increased.13 Individuals are somewhat more optimistic over the five-year horizon. There, the average subjective probability is about 54 percent. But the discrepancy with the historical
record is even greater, as in every five-year interval between 1991 and 2009,
US actual housing prices increased.14 Most likely, such pessimistic expectations are a partial explanation for the decline in spending reported in
Tables 4.1 and 4.4.

Stock market expectations
Using the same format as for house price expectations, respondents were
asked about the chances the stock market would be higher in a year. This
question was asked in both HRS 2008 and in the HRS Internet survey, so we
can make a direct comparison of the same people over time. Figure 4.1
shows the cumulative distribution of reported subjective probabilities of a
gain. The distribution for 2009 is shifted to the left of the 2008 distribution,
showing a reduction in the average expectation of a gain. Indeed, the
average subjective probability declined from 52 percent probability in
2008 to 41 percent probability in the HRS Internet survey. The decline
was particularly striking at the lower part of the distribution: at the 25th
percentile, the subjective probability was 40 percent in 2008, but it was just
20 percent in 2009. As with housing prices, such pessimistic expectations
may explain some of the spending decline.

Subjective bequest probabilities
Using the same format, the HRS asked respondents about the probability
they would leave a bequest greater than $10,000. If this reported probability was positive, the question was repeated with a target of $100,000 and
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100
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70
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0
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100

Subjective probability
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Figure 4.1 Cumulative distribution of the reported subjective probability of a stock
market gain one year ahead
Source: Authors’ calculations.

then with a target of $500,000. In cross-section, these subjective bequest
probabilities varied positively with wealth, which increases our confidence
that they are predictive of actual bequests. We expect some of the losses of
assets between 2008 and 2009 would result in lower bequests, as well as
lower consumption. Table 4.9 shows the implied distribution of probability
mass in the population in each of the wealth intervals. Averaging over all
responses, the probability of a bequest less than $10,000 was 16.2 percent
and the probability of a bequest between $10,000 and $100,000 was 19.8
percent. It is clear that between 2008 and 2009, the probability mass shifted
toward the lower wealth bands, reflecting wealth losses.
We calculate expected bequests by multiplying the expected bequest
within a wealth band by the probability of a bequest in that interval and
then summing over all intervals. The expected bequest within an interval is
calculated from the observed distribution of wealth in that interval in the
2008 HRS. The average wealth in the interval 0 to $10,000 was $1,831, and
the expected contribution to bequests from that interval was $296. Summing over all intervals, we find that expected bequests declined from
$542,364 in 2008 to $441,571 in the HRS Internet survey. This reduction
is entirely dominated by the top interval, which is a result of the highly
skewed distribution of wealth.
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Table 4.9 Bequest probabilities and expected bequests ($ 2010), weighted
Wealth band

0 to <$10k
$10k to <$100k
$100k to <$500k
$500k or more
All

Average
bequest
probability
(%)

Average
wealth
($)

Expected bequests ($)

2008

2009

In 2008

Using 2008
probabilities

Using 2009
probabilities

16.2
19.8
35.2
28.8
100

23.9
20.2
33.4
22.4
100

1,831
52,792
275,134
1,508,899
715,417

296
10,448
96,921
434,699
542,364

438
10,684
92,005
338,445
441,571

Note: N = 3,061.
Source: Authors’ calculations from weighted HRS data.

Effects on retirement
The interval between the HRS 2008 interview and the 2009 Internet interview was too short to observe many actual retirements. But, over many
waves, the HRS has asked workers about retirement expectations (in the
form of the subjective probability of working past ages 62 and 65). We call
these subjective probabilities P62 and P65. Earlier work has shown that they
are predictive of actual retirement (Hurd and Rohwedder, 2009), and that
they have an advantage over data on actual retirement because changes in
the subjective probabilities control for individual fixed effects, such as
unmeasured permanent taste differences. Such fixed effects are difficult
to control for when using data on actual retirement. We expect that the
financial crisis would have had two opposing effects on retirement. The
declines in stock and possibly housing values should have delayed retirement because of the unexpected loss of wealth. Yet the worsening of the
labor market and increased risk of unemployment should have led to
earlier expected retirement, because the older population often has
more difficulty in finding a job. The net effect is an empirical matter.
Table 4.10 shows averages of P62 for the population of workers in
HRS 2008 who were respondents in the Internet interview.15 The average
increased from 58.2 to 61.7 percent, a large increase over a short
time period (a little more than a year for some respondents and less than
six months for others). To put that change in perspective, the labor force
participation rate of the older population has risen during the 1990s,
and particularly in the 2000s. In 2003, the rate among those aged 60–64
was 51 percent, and was 54.1 percent in 2008.16 The increase over five years
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Table 4.10 Average subjective probability (%) of working past age 62 among those
working in 2008: ages 51–61
All

HRS 2008
HRS 2009 Internet
N

Work status in 2009
Working

Not working

60.9
65.9
917

44.7
40.3
145

58.2
61.7
1,062

Notes : Average for ‘all’ is not equal to the weighted average of ‘working’ and ‘not working’
when the weights are the sample sizes. The average for ‘all’ uses the HRS person weight
adjusted for the Internet interview.
Source : Authors’ calculations from weighted HRS data.

was 3.1 percentage points, about the same as the increase in P 62 over six
to twelve months. If future actual labor force participation is well predicted
by P62, these data suggest an acceleration of the trend toward deferred
retirement.
We note, however, that the stock market reached its low in March 2009—
just a month before the HRS Internet survey was initially fielded. Since
then, it has recouped some of its earlier losses, so possibly some of the
negative effect of the stock market decline on wealth has dissipated. Also,
the unemployment rate today is slightly higher than during the Internet
survey. But most importantly, any expectations among respondents at the
time of the survey that the unemployment rate would recover quickly were
not realized. Instead, the mood about the labor market is likely worse today
than it was in May 2009.
The table shows P 62 both in HRS 2008 and 2009 according to work status
in the 2009 Internet survey. There are 145 individuals who were working in
2008 and so were asked about P62, but who were not working at the time of
the Internet survey. When they were working in 2008, their average P 62 was
just 44.7 percent. That low value compared with P62 among those who
were still working in 2009 shows the power of P 62 to predict future labor
force participation. But a striking comparison is between the changes in
P 62 across the two groups. Among those who continued to work, P 62
increased by 5 percentage points; among those who stopped working,
P 62 declined by 4.4 percentage points. This difference in the change may
well reflect the differing effects of the stock and housing market losses and
of the worsening of the labor market.
Table 4.11 offers similar statistics with respect to working past age 65.
Qualitatively, we find the same patterns as for P 62: an overall increase in
P65 driven by increases among those working in 2008 and 2009, which
offsets declines among those not working in 2009. Yet the magnitude of
the increase was remarkably larger for P65, a little over double the increase
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Table 4.11 Average subjective probability (%) of working past age 65 among those
working in 2008: ages 51–61
All

HRS 2008
HRS 2009 Internet
N

Work status in 2009
Working

Not working

39.6
49.5
911

33.4
30.8
145

38.6
46.4
1,056

Notes: Average for ‘all’ is not equal to the weighted average of ‘working’ and ‘not working’
when the weights are the sample sizes. The average for ‘all’ uses the HRS person weight
adjusted for the Internet interview.
Source: Authors’ calculations from weighted HRS data.

observed in P 62 (for an increase of 7.8 percentage points, from 38.6 to 46.4).
Putting it in historical perspective, according to CPS statistics (see note 15),
the labor force participation rate among those aged 65–69 was 23 percent in
1999. By 2008, it had risen to 30.7 percent—a change of 7.7 percent. Thus,
the increase in the predicted labor force participation rate in just nine
months of the economic crisis was about the same magnitude as the actual
increase over nine years. Even if respondents have revised their expectations
about working past age 65 since May 2009 when the HRS Internet interview
was fielded—possibly due to increases in the stock market and worsening
of the labor market since then—it is unlikely that P65 will have returned to
its 2008 levels. That would suggest that the economic crisis will accelerate
the trend of the past two decades of increased labor force participation
among the older population. The stratification by work status in 2009 reveals
another difference with P 62: the levels of P65 in 2008 were much more
comparable (just a 6 percentage-point difference for P65, compared to a
16 percentage-point difference in P62).

Conclusion
The 2007–9 recession imposed substantial losses in stocks and housing on
the older US population, and these losses particularly affected the retirement security of those at or nearing retirement. While stock values have
recovered somewhat since March 2009, house prices have not. For the
majority of older households, housing is the most important asset. In May
2009, HRS respondents were pessimistic that house and stock prices would
recover any time soon (in next year). Both actual losses and this pessimism
led many households to reduce spending, with a stronger effect on households aged 50–64. Those aged 65+ were less affected, due to having more
home equity and Social Security. With wealth positions substantially
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reduced, it may be that households will pass on less wealth to the next
generation. According to respondents’ subjective beliefs, this will be the
case, and the reductions may be sizeable (about 20 percent on average).
The median older household will not see much change because the
bequest effect is concentrated among households with high wealth. The
economic downturn also appears to have accelerated the increase in
deferred retirement seen over the past twenty years. This accelerated
trend will relieve some of the financial pressures facing Social Security
and Medicare programs, since both programs will benefit from additional
tax revenues when people work longer.
In sum, the economic crisis has caused households in and near retirement to respond in several ways: they reduced spending, saved more, and
believed they will work longer. They also will pass on less to their children.
Future work will assess whether these intentions come true.
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Endnotes
1. Related studies in this volume include Butrica et al. (2012), Chai et al. (2012),
and Coronado and Dynan (2012).
2. The CAMS 2005 also included a subsample of the Early Baby Boomer cohort
recruited into the HRS sample in 2004.
3. For example, some homeowners (as recorded in the HRS core) did not report a
value in CAMS for ‘rent’; we impute rents of $0 for these cases. Resulting
spending levels are close to totals from the Consumer Expenditure Survey
(www.bls.gov/cex) for the age groups 55–74. The CEX collects the most detailed
and comprehensive information on total spending by households. CAMS shows
higher levels of spending than the CEX among those aged 75 or over. There is no
obvious reason that this difference should show in this age group, but not in the
younger age group. However, we believe that the higher CAMS totals are more
accurate than those in the CEX because they better match observed rates of
wealth decumulation at older ages. When compared with after-tax income in the
HRS, the lower levels of spending in CEX imply that single persons accumulate
wealth, whereas in panel, they decumulate wealth (Hurd and Rohwedder, 2009).
4. Unit response rates in the first two HRS Internet surveys (conditional on being
invited to participate) were 70 percent.
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5. We have rich background information from the HRS core survey for those who
did not participate in the HRS Internet survey, and this information can be used
to reweight any results from the Internet survey.
6. The changes in Table 4.4 are derived from the ratios of mean and median
spending. The mean of household-level spending change is not a good indicator of population spending change because observation error causes bias in the
ratio.
7. On average, the two-year changes in household size among the 50–64-year-old
households show a decline of 6 percent for the period 2001–7.
8. Accessed on August 18, 2011 at http://www.standardandpoors.com/indices/
sp-case-shiller-home-price-indices/en/us/?indexId=spusa-cashpidff–p-us——
9. These price changes are not directly comparable with the Case–Shiller index,
which is confined to twenty large cities.
10. In defining the sample, we do not include imputed information on home
ownership, nor whether the household has any mortgage or other home loans.
11. Note that median housing debt shows a decline between 2006 and later years in
Table 4.7, which is not observed in Table 4.6. We place more weight on the
evidence in Table 4.6 as it is based on a larger sample (Table 4.6 includes
observations with incomplete reports for amounts which are imputed, while
Table 4.7 excludes these observations).
12. These percentages of homeowners with negative equity are more representative
of the population than those obtained from sources such as lenders or property
records which are either incomplete or outdated.
13. Calculated as the percentage of twelve-month intervals over which the housing
price index increased between January 1, 1991 and November 1, 2009.
14. Calculated as the percentage of five-year intervals over which the housing price
index increased from January 1, 1991 to November 1, 2009. See note 12.
15. In HRS 2008, P 62 was only asked of workers younger than age 62. In the Internet
survey, the question was asked irrespective of labor force status, so we have
responses from people who had stopped working between the two surveys, as
well as from those who were still working.
16. See ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/lf/aa2003/aat3.txt and ftp.bls.gov/pub/
special.requests/lf/aa2008/aat3.txt, accessed August 18, 2011.
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